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I. INTRODUCTION
"We do not want children trapped in schools that will not change and
will not teach. "l
Dubbed the "No Child Left Behind Act" ("NCLB"), 2 Congress's sweep-
ing and much publicized 2002 revision and reenactment of the Elementary and
I Remarks on Signing the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in Hamilton, Ohio, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 23, 25 (Jan. 8, 2002).
2 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (Supp. II 2002).
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Secondary Education Act ("ESEA"),3 is the most ambitious and intrusive fed-
eral education legislation to date.4 The revision effort, spearheaded by President
Bush's leadership, passed with bipartisan support' in a laudable attempt to once
and for all close the persistent achievement gap between advantaged and disad-
vantaged children.6 Although the ESEA was enacted for that purpose nearly
forty years ago and has been periodically revised ever since, little national aca-
demic improvement has been observed.7 Indeed, since 1965, American taxpay-
ers have spent more than $321 billion in federal funds on public education; yet,
over three decades later, sixty percent of twelfth-graders are still not reading
proficiently.8 In addition, the disparity between reading scores of minority stu-
dents and white students has continued to widen, increasing sixteen percentage
points in the last decade.9 NCLB represents the latest federal effort to quell the
3 The ESEA was first enacted in 1965. It created the federal "Title I" funding system, a key
element of President Lyndon B. Johnson's "War on Poverty," that benefits low-income public
school districts. See ESEA, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965); Peter Zamora, In Recognition of
the Special Educational Needs of Low-income Families?: Ideological Discord and Its Effects
Upon Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Acts of 1965 and 2001, 10 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 413, 418 (2003) (discussing the history and origin of the ESEA and the
increased federal presence in education policy). Since 1965, the ESEA has been periodically
amended and reenacted under a series of popular names. The current version of the ESEA was
revised in 2002 and is popularly called the "No Child Left Behind Act."
4 See James Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 932, 937 (2004). A number of States and educational groups argue that the federal govern-
ment has gone too far. A task force for the National Conference of State Legislatures stated that
"the federal government's role has become excessively intrusive in the day-to-day operations of
public education." TASK FORCE ON No CHILD LEFr BEHIND: FINAL REPORT 11 (National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures ed. 2005). Several states have considered or passed resolutions charg-
ing that NCLB "egregiously violates the time-honored American principles of balanced federal-
ism." S. Res. 437, 2005 Sess. (Va. 2005); H.R.J. Res. 27, 73rd Leg. (Or. 2005); H.R. 6, 77th Leg.,
1st Sess. (W.Va. 2004).
5 ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND AVOIDANCE IN THE BUSH EDUCATION PLAN:
THE 'No CHILD LEEr BEHIND ACT OF 2001' 1 (2002).
6 20 U.S.C. § 6301(3). The purpose of NCLB is to "ensure that all children have a fair, equal,
and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education." 20 U.S.C. § 6301. NCLB seeks
to accomplish this purpose by "[c]losing the achievement gap between high and low-performing
children, especially the achievement gaps between minority and non-minority students, and be-
tween disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers." Id.
7 This failure is partly due to dismal state compliance with NCLB's predecessor revision, the
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 ("IASA"), Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994).
8 The Facts About Getting Results, http://www.ed.gov/nclb/accountability/results/get-
ting.results.pdf (1998 figure) (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
9 Zamora, supra note 3, at 413 (citing National Center for Education Statistics, Educational
Achievement and Black-White Inequality (July 2001)). The sixteen-percentage point increase
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"rising tide of mediocrity" threatening to engulf many of America's public
schools. °
NCLB hopes to live up to the promise of its name by pairing stringent
accountability measures with lofty student performance goals." Under the Act,
states are required to create "challenging" performance standards and hold dis-
tricts and schools accountable for ensuring that students meet these standards.'
2
Consequences for falling short of performance goals are tougher than ever.
13
The most intensely debated penalty facing persistently underachieving schools
is mandatory public school choice.' 4 Schools that do not meet yearly progress
goals for two consecutive years are required to offer all of their students the
opportunity to transfer to a higher performing school. 15 Advocates hope that the
provision will act not only as a "life preserver for economically disadvantaged
children" but also as a "competitive incentive for public schools to improve."'
16
Yet, early results suggest that despite high congressional expectations, NCLB
choice is not adequately fulfilling either role. 17  Thus far, the public school
choice provisions have proven to be a small band-aid for a very large wound.
18
Individual students continue to be held back by the "soft bigotry of low expecta-
tions"'19 because of slipshod implementation and the lack of meaningful transfer
options.2 In the face of low student transfer numbers, competitive incentive has
dwindled and schools remain largely uninspired by the school choice require-
ment.2 ' If public school choice is to play an integral role in ensuring that no
10 NATIONAL COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF EDUC., A NATION
AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATION REFORM, A REPORT TO THE NATION AND SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION 5 (1983) [hereinafter A NATION AT RISK].
it 20 U.S.C. § 6316.
12 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(I)(A)-(C).
13 20 U.S.C. § 6316.
14 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E).
15 Id.
16 Empowering Success: Flexibility and School Choice: Before the Committee on Education
and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 63-64 (2001) (testimony of Clint Bolick, Litigation Director,
Institute for Justice).
17 See Ronald Brownstein, Implementing No Child Left Behind, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL
CHOICE 213, 214 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 2003) (noting that on any given morning the number of
students transferring under NCLB in even the Nation's largest cities "might not fill a single school
bus").
18 See CYNTHIA G. BROWN, CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CHOOSING BETrER
SCHOOLS: A REPORT ON STUDENT TRANSFERS UNDER THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 27 (Dianne
M. Pichd and William L. Taylor eds., 2004), available at http://www.cccr.org/ ChoosingBetter-
Schools.pdf [hereinafter CHOOSING BETTER SCHOOLS].
19 This phrase was frequently used by President Bush in his speeches about the need for educa-
tion reform. See Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at Griegos Elementary School in
Albuquerque, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1169, 1170 (Aug. 20, 2001).
20 See infra Part III.C. 1-2.
21 See CHOOSING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 29.
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child is left behind, obstacles to effective implementation must be eliminated.
Congress and the Department of Education must work together with States to
22create quality transfer options. Parents must be given the opportunity to en-
force the promise that their children will not be "trapped in schools that will not
change and will not teach. 23
This Article discusses public school choice under NCLB, points to ob-
stacles that are preventing the program from reaching its full potential, and sug-
gests changes that would address these obstacles. Part I of this Article provides
a brief overview of the rise of school choice as a vehicle for school reform and
presents the ideologies of both proponents and opponents of choice. Further,
Part I explains the structure of the No Child Left Behind legislation and some of
its key components. Part II discusses the congressional debate concerning pro-
posed school choice programs and then lays out the resulting public school
choice provisions. Part II then goes on to discuss these provisions and to high-
light some of the obstacles that are preventing the current version of NCLB
choice from realizing its goals. Part III suggests ways in which transfer oppor-
tunities could be increased to provide parents and students with meaningful edu-
cational choices. Part IV makes projections about the future of public school
choice under the NCLB regime.
I. BACKGROUND
A. School Choice
School choice is not a concept unique to NCLB. 24 Many states and lo-
cal communities had already instituted some form of school choice before the
2002 Act.25 Indeed, the concept of school choice has been gaining momentum
for decades.26 While wealthy and middle class parents have always exercised
"choice" over which schools their children attend by building homes in affluent
22 See infra Part IV.
23 See Remarks on Signing the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in Hamilton, Ohio, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 23, 25 (Jan. 8, 2002); see also infra Part IV.
24 See Philip T.K. Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the Polemic
of Legal Problems be Overcome?, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 3 (1993) (noting that school choice has
been a goal of reformers since at least the eighteenth century).
25
In 1989, four states-Arkansas, Iowa, Nebraska, and Ohio-adopted parental
choice in some form; in 1990, seven states-Wisconsin, Colorado, Wash-
ington, Vermont, Utah, Idaho, and Kentucky-enacted choice plans; and in
1990, ten states approved some form of new choice legislation, 37 states had
choice legislation pending in one form or another, and at least 12 states had
citizen coalitions working on choice initiatives or proposals.
Id. at 2 n.5 (citing United States Dep't of Educ., Office of Intergovernmental and Interagency
Affairs, Ctr. For Choice in Educ., Review of State Choice Legislation (Sept. 1992)).
26 See id. at 6-7.
[Vol. 108
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districts or paying for private education, choice options for low-income students
did not begin to arise in America until the mid-1980s.27 On the heels of national
reports bemoaning the condition of the nation's public schools, 28 many states
scrambled to create programs to improve public education. 29 From this effort,
school choice "'emerged as the single most rousing idea"' in the push for re-
form.
30
At the core of the school choice movement are two theories. The first,
taking a page from economic market analysis, suggests that the market pressure
created by school choice will force educators to improve in order to compete for
students. 31 Just as monopolies are bad for business, supporters reason, they are
also bad for education.32 Competition promises to foster new ideas and a higher
quality of education overall because schools must either demonstrate perform-
ance or else loose their students to competitors.33 The second theory focuses on
an individualized approach to education. It suggests that increasing educational
options will improve education because students will be free to choose the op-
tion that best suits their individual needs. 34 Because children respond differently
to different kinds of educational environments, a system that adapts to individ-
ual learning styles will likely produce the best results.35
Yet, not everyone shares the view that school choice will be a "pana-
cea" 36 for the floundering public school system.37 Opponents to choice pro-
27 See id.
28 The most prominent report was conducted by the U.S. Department of Education. See gen-
erally A NATION AT RISK, supra note 10.
29 Reform activities included: "increased state allocations for local school system budgets;
tighter state controls over curriculum, personnel training, textbook selection, instructional meth-
ods, and discipline; the creation of school-based management plans; and a greater voice in school
decisions for teachers." Daniel, supra note 24, at 7.
30 Id. (quoting CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, SCHOOL CHOICE: A
SPECIAL REPORT 1 (1992)).
31 NATIONAL WORKING COMMISSION ON CHOICE IN K-12 EDUCATION, SCHOOL CHOICE: DOING
IT THE RIGHT WAY MAKES A DIFFERENCE 15-16 (The Brown Center on Education Policy, The
Brookings Institution ed., 2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/gs/brownl
20031117schoolchoicereport.pdf. [hereinafter COMM'N ON CHOICE]. Support for public school
choice policies reflects a faith in market pressures that is a consistent theme of conservative poli-
tics. GAIL L. SUNDERMAN, IMPLEMENTING A MAJOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM: No CHILD LEFT
BEHIND AND FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS: FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9 (2003).




36 JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 217 (1990).
Chubb and Moe are perhaps the most adamant proponents of school choice as a reform method.
They argue that choice "has the capacity ... to bring about the kind of transformation that, for
years, reformers have been seeking to engineer in myriad other ways. Indeed, if choice is to work
to [the] greatest advantage, it must be adopted without these other reforms, since the latter are
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grams argue that market forces open public education to corruption rather than
correction and that competition always results in stratification by race, class, or
religion. 38 Further, detractors fear that school choice will cause an exodus of the
best students and the best teachers from lower-performing schools, thus leaving
struggling schools worse off than before.39
Regardless of the opinions of critics, however, the past two decades
have seen an attempt to create more educational alternatives than ever before.
4
0
Many states provide a host of educational options such as magnet schools,
41
charter schools, 42 "alternative" schools, 43 and home schooling. Additionally, a
few states are testing the waters with more far-reaching and innovative choice
options such as open enrollment,44 voucher programs,45 and "virtual" schools.46
By enacting NCLB, the federal government joins the movement to arm Amer-
ica's students with increased public education opportunities by mandating pub-
lic school choice programs in underperforming schools that accept Title I fund-
ing.
predicated on democratic control and are implemented by bureaucratic means." Id. (emphasis in
original).
37 COMM'N ON CHOICE, supra note 31, at 16-17.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 14-15.
41 A school that specializes in a particular field or methodology such as math and science,
foreign language, or fine arts. Id. at 14.
42 A public school operated independently of the local school board. Charter schools operate
under contract with the State or district and are free from many of the governmental regulations
that regular public schools must follow. CHOOSING BE'TTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 27.
43 A school that provides a more flexible and less restrictive environment for students who are
struggling in traditional high schools. Id.
44 Programs that permit students to enroll in or transfer to inter- or intra-district schools. Id.
45 State, federal, or private money given to a student to be used toward tuition at a private
school. Id. at 28. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court held that use of federal voucher money to
attend a religious school does not violate the Establishment Clause when the money reaches such
school as a result of individual rather than government choice. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
46 School curriculum is accessed primarily via the internet. BRYAN C. HASSEL & MICHELLE
GODARD TERRELL, How CAN VIRTUAL SCHOOLS BE A VIBRANT PART OF MEETING THE CHOICE
PROVISIONS OF THE No CHILD LEpr BEHIND ACT? 2-4, http://www.nationaledtechplan.org/docu-
ments/Hassel-Terrell-VirtualSchools.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2005). Virtual schools may be oper-
ated by the State, a district, a business, or a university. Id. Online curriculum may also be used to
supplement home school education. Id.
47 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E) (Supp. II 2002).
[Vol. 108
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B. The No Child Left Behind Act
NCLB is composed of several .Titles, the most important and well
known of which is Title 1.48 Title I was first enacted in 1965 pursuant to Con-
gress's spending power. 49 Under Title I, high-poverty districts receive annual
grants to improve the quality of education for disadvantaged children. 50  Dis-
tricts then distribute money to high-poverty schools.5' In exchange for the fed-
eral funding, states, districts, 52 and schools must comply with various condi-
tions. 53 When Title I was in its infancy, grants initially came with very few pre-
scriptions. 54 As a result, many states applied the money to more general educa-
tional purposes and underprivileged children continued to receive a smaller por-
tion of the pie.55 Since 1965, a number of subsequent revisions to Title I have
addressed this problem by tying more and more strings to the receipt of federal
funds.56 NCLB is perhaps the most prescriptive version yet, promising states
and schools increased funding and flexibility but requiring a much greater ac-
countability for results.57
48 Title I of the No Child Left Behind Act is composed of 9 Parts (Parts A-I). Part A, how-
ever, is the one commonly referred to as "Title I." Thus, this Article refers to Title I, Part A:
"Improving Basic Programs Operated by Local Education Agencies" as simply "Title I." The
remaining Parts of Title I are each geared toward specific populations such as migratory children
and dropouts.
49 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941.
50 All school districts with at least a two percent child poverty rate as determined by 20 U.S.C.
§ 6333(c), are eligible to received federal Title I funds. 20 U.S.C. § 6333(b).
51 Individual schools within Title I districts receive funds in rank order on the basis of the total
number of children from low-income families in each eligible attendance area or school. 20
U.S.C. § 6313(c).
52 NCLB refers to school districts as "local education agencies" ("LEAs"). Although a charter
school within a school district would constitute its own LEA, in all other instances the terms "dis-
trict" and "LEA" are coextensive. Thus, this Article will refer to LEAs simply as "districts."
53 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311-6322.
54 Zamora, supra note 3, at 424.
55 Id. Senators Dominick, Murphy, and Fannin foresaw this problem when the ESEA was first
passed. They noted that Title I funds "are to be so widely disbursed that over 94 percent of the
counties in the country would receive funds. This can hardly be called a pinpointing of funds to
areas of need." ESEA, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965). In 1999, the Department of Educa-
tion began making allocations at the district level, in an effort to reduce states' roles in the alloca-
tion process and to make district treatment more uniform. Comprehensive Information Source on
Title I and Compensatory Education, http://www.titlei.comldistfund.htm (last visited Oct. 6,
2005).
56 See Zamora, supra note 3, at 432-33.
57 Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations for 2002: Before Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations Subcommittee, 107th Cong.
755 (2001) (testimony of John A. Boehner).
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To achieve its purpose of "ensur[ing] that all children have a fair, equal,
and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education, 58 NCLB requires
schools to comply with rigorous teaching, testing, and accountability stan-
dards. 59 At the core of these new requirements is a high-stakes testing system
that calls for states to develop "challenging" academic standards 60 and to more
than double the number of tests required by the previous version of the ESEA.61
The results of these tests and other indicators, such as graduation and attendance
rates, are then used to determine whether schools are making adequate yearly
progress toward the Act's ultimate goal of one hundred percent student profi-
ciency by the year 2014.62
Adequate yearly progress ("AYP") is the measuring stick by which all
schools are judged under NCLB.6 3 Title I schools that fail to meet AYP are
58 20 U.S.C. § 6301.
59 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311-6322.
60 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1).
61 Compare 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3) with IASA, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § Ill(b)(3), 108 Stat.
3518, 3524-25 (1994). NCLB requires annual tests in reading and math in grades three through
eight, at least one such test between grades ten through twelve, and beginning in 2007-8 at least
three science tests between grades three through twelve. 20 U.S.C. §6311(b)(3). The annual
testing requirement does not begin until 2005-6. Id. Before then, students must be tested once in
grades three through five, once in grades six through nine, and once in grades ten through twelve.
Id. Under the Improving America's Schools Act, ("IASA"), no science testing was required and
only two tests, rather than the current six, were required between grades three and eight. Pub. L.
No. 103-382, § 1111(b)(3), 108 Stat. 3518, 3524-25 (1994).
62 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2). It is left to the discretion of each state to implement a testing sys-
tem and to determine what test score constitutes proficiency. See Ryan, supra note 4, at 953. It is
further up to the states to set the requisite yearly progress goals so that by 2014 all schools will
achieve one hundred percent proficiency. Id. at 940. Despite statutory language encouraging
"continuous and substantial academic improvement" during each year leading up to 2014, a num-
ber of states have structured their progress goals like "balloon mortgages" so that schools are only
required to make very small improvements in the first several years of implementation. Id. at 946-
47. While this method makes it easier for schools to meet AYP in the initial stages of NCLB, as
2014 nears, those schools will likely find it impossible to make the large gains that will be neces-
sary to reach the one hundred percent proficiency mark. Id.
63 See Ryan, supra note 4, at 940. NCLB's stringent accountability system relies heavily on
standardized testing to measure the quality of school performance. Id. Since AYP hinges on
meeting "proficiency" goals as measured by student test scores, tests are extremely high-stakes for
schools and districts desiring to avoid sanctions. However, there is a notable disconnect between
a school's interest in test results and a student's interest. More often than not, no consequences
flow to individual students who perform poorly on the state tests used to measure student profi-
ciency. 'No Child' Law Prompts Student Incentives, All Things Considered, April 12, 2004,
http://www.npr. org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1834479. These test scores generally are
not examined by or even ever reported to college admissions boards or scholarship programs. Id.
Nor is a specific score required to earn a high school diploma. Id. Consequently, schools are not
only finding it difficult to motivate students to perform but also to even show up for the test. Id.
Test day attendance is of great concern to schools because NCLB imposes sanctions if less than
95% of the student body or of any subgroup takes each assessment test. 20 U.S.C. §
6311(b)(2)(I)(ii). As a result, many schools are beginning to offer student incentives, ranging
[Vol. 108
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deemed "in need of improvement" and trigger a series of additive and increas-
ingly invasive reform methods.64 After two consecutive years of failure to meet
AYP, schools enter "improvement" status and must offer their students the op-
portunity to transfer to a non-failing school. 65 Additionally, the school must
create an improvement plan and is entitled to technical assistance from the state
with such tasks as analysis of testing data, professional development, and revi-
sion of the school budget.66 After three consecutive years of failure, schools
must also offer supplemental services, such as after-school or summer school
tutoring, to those low-income students who choose not to transfer.67 After four
years of failure, schools enter the "corrective" phase, which includes such meas-
ures as instituting new curriculum, replacing school staff, and appointing an
expert to advise administration. Finally, after five years of failure, schools are
subject to "restructuring" under which school operations are turned over to a
private management company or the state.68 A school that is identified for im-
provement, corrective action, or restructuring remains in such status until the
school makes AYP for two consecutive years.69 Parents of children attending
affected schools must be notified promptly of a change in status and be provided
with an explanation of the low achievement problem.7°
In order to avoid "in need of improvement" status, schools must meet
AYP for both the entire student body and for certain statutorily identified sub-
groups of students.7 1 If any of these subgroups fails to meet AYP, the entire
school is treated as failing.72 To illustrate, if in a given year a school must reach
75% proficiency, 75% of the student body as a whole must be proficient and
75% of the students in each subgroup must be proficient. If, for example, only
from "ice cream to DVD players and college scholarships," in order to get kids to take the tests
required under NCLB. 'No Child' Law Prompts Student Incentives, supra.
64 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b).
65 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1).
66 Id.
67 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(5).
68 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(7)-(8).
69 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(12).
70 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(6).
71 Schools must disaggregate data for and meet AYP in each of the following subgroups: 1)
economically disadvantaged students, 2) students from major racial and ethnic groups, 3) students
with disabilities, and 4) students with limited English proficiency. 20 U.S.C. §
6311 (b)(2)(C)(v)(II)(aa)-(dd).
72 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(A). If a subgroup does not meet proficiency goals, a school can still
meet AYP under the "safe harbor" provision. GAO REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,
No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT: EDUCATION NEEDS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
AND CONDUCT IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES FOR SCHOOL CHOICE PROVISION 6 n.6 (2004), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d057.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. To qualify for "safe har-
bor" a school must have reduced the percentage of students in the failing subgroup by at least 10%
since the previous year. Id. Further, the subgroup must show progress on another academic indi-
cator such as graduation rates. Id.
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65% of a school's subgroup of mentally handicapped students meet proficiency,
then the entire school is penalized for failing to meet AYP.
All public schools in a state are required to meet AYP, but only those
schools that accept federal Title I funding are subject to the penalty provisions.73
Currently, over half of the public schools in the Nation receive Title I funds.74
Of the nation's approximately forty-nine million students, about twenty-five
million attend schools eligible for Title I money.75 Even with the help of federal
funding, however, many schools that serve low-income populations still struggle
to make ends meet.76 Accordingly, although many educators consider NCLB's
standards unrealistic, no state has yet opted out of Title I funds to avoid NCLB's
penalties.77
III. ANALYSIS OF NCLB'S CHOICE PROVISIONS
"[NCLB] will give students a chance, parents a choice, and schools a
charge to be the best in the world. ,
78
Recognizing that school reform too often moves at a glacial pace, Con-
gress authorized public school choice for all students attending schools in the
improvement, corrective, and restructuring penalty phases of NCLB reform.79
By revising the ESEA to make public school choice mandatory rather than op-
tional, Congress provided an escape valve for individual students floundering in
inadequate schools.80 In this way, NCLB attempts to prevent at-risk students
from falling further behind while waiting for their schools to improve--
something the Nation has been waiting for since the passage of the ESEA nearly
forty years ago. 81 Additionally, proponents hope that pressure created by the
73 See DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE: NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE 2
(Draft Feb. 6, 2004), available at http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/schoolchoiceguid.pdf.
[hereinafter NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE].
74 Fact Sheet on Title I, Part A, http://www.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/disadv/titlel-factsheet.pdf
(last visited Oct. 6, 2005). Fifty-eight percent of public schools receive Title I funding. Id.
75 GAO REPORT, supra note 72, at 5.
76 See Gina Austin, Note, Leaving Federalism Behind: How the No Child Left Behind Act
Usurps States' Rights, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 337, 341 (2005).
77 See National Conference of State Legislatures, No Child Left Behind, Quick Facts 2004-
2005, http://www.ncsl. org/programs/educ/NCLB2005LegActivity.htm#legactivity05 (last visited
Oct. 6, 2005).
78 147 CONG. REC. E437 (daily ed. March 22, 2001) (introduction of H.R. 1, the No Child Left
Behind Act, by Rep. Boehner).
79 20 U.S.C. § 6316 (Supp. 112002).
80 NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 2.
81 See Transforming the Federal Role in Education for the 21st Century: Hearing on H.R. 1,
H.R. 340, and H.R. 345: Before the Committee on Education and the Workforce Hearings, 107th
Cong. 81, 85 (2001) (testimony of Gail E. Foster, Ed. D., on behalf of Black Alliance for Educa-
tional Options and Toussaint Institute Fund).
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free-market competition of school choice will motivate schools to reform and
thereby promote NCLB's ultimate goal of high-quality education at all public
schools.
While most members of Congress agreed that some form of school
choice should be included in NCLB, there was much disagreement about the
kind and extent of choice necessary to improve the educational opportunities of
low-income students.83 The resulting legislation was the product of much de-
bate and compromise and reflects a blend of educational approaches from dif-
ferent administrations throughout the years. 84
A. The Debate
After the one hundred and sixth Congress ended in a stalemate that saw
no reauthorization of the ESEA, newcomer President Bush made it a central
goal of his domestic policy to achieve the elusive balance of bipartisanship re-
quired to create legislation that would leave no child behind.85 The ideological
splits were typical, with Democrats demanding increased spending for smaller
classes, teacher training, and school construction (the "traditional" ESEA fo-
cuses), while Republican critics charged that such measures would once again
mean more money and no change.
86
Conservatives were adamant that private school choice would be the
best reform method. 87 Liberals, on the other hand, feared that a voucher pro-
gram would "raid the [public school] system, bleeding and hemorrhaging" 88 by
draining resources from already struggling public schools. In order for the
White House to fulfill its campaign promise that "bipartisan education reform
will be the cornerstone of [this] Administration, ''89 a compromise needed to be
struck. It became clear that to get the legislation to move, Republicans would
have to give up on private school choice in order for Democrats to support an-
nual testing.90 To the chagrin of Congress's most staunch private school choice
supporters, President Bush did not try to force private options because he did
82 NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 2.
83 See 147 CONG. REc. H2590 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) (debating the addition of a private
school voucher system to NCLB).
84 RUDALEVIGE, supra note 5, at 2-3. For instance, NLCB's focus on high standards draws on
the Clinton administration's IASA and "Goals 2000," the accountability structure has roots in
Congressional debates from Clinton's second term, and the notion of school choice has been ex-
plicitly debated at least since the Reagan administration. Id. at 7-8.
85 Id. at 15-16.
86 Id. at 27.
87 Id.
88 147 CONG. REC. H2593 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) (argument of Congressman Joe Baca, CA).
89 RUDALEVIGE, supra note 5, at 21.
90 Id.
11
Aikens: Being Choosy: An Analysis of Public School Choice under No Child
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
not want to "sacrifice accountability on the altar of [private] school choice."
91
Accordingly, Title I "portability," a form of private school voucher, was re-
moved from the draft legislation early on in the debates.92 Private school choice
remained defeated despite a later amendment attempt to resurrect it.93 A privati-
zation option for supplemental services was included as a partial substitute for
the absence of private school vouchers.
94
B. The Compromise: NCLB's Public School Choice Provisions
On January 8, 2002, President Bush signed into law the final version of
NCLB that was approved by a bipartisan Congress. The legislation provides
that public school choice is a mandatory consequence for those federally funded
schools that fail to meet AYP.95 When a Title I school does not make AYP for
two consecutive years, all students in that school become eligible to transfer to a
non-failing public school.9 6 If all students cannot attend their first choice of
school or if there are insufficient transportation funds to accommodate all trans-
ferring students, priority for seats and transportation money must be given to the
lowest achieving low-income students.97 Districts may not, however, use lack
of capacity as a reason to deny student transfers. 98 If no AYP-proficient schools
are available within a district, the district must attempt, to the extent practicable,
to enter into cooperative transfer agreements with neighboring districts.99
Further, districts are obligated to provide for transportation to receiving
schools but only as long as the child's original school remains in improvement




95 20 U.S.C. § 6316 (Supp. II 2002). Under an unsafe schools provision, transfer options must
also be provided to students who 1) attend persistently dangerous schools or 2) become victims of
violent criminal offenses on school grounds. 20 U.S.C. § 7912. A district need not offer public
school choice in any instance if state law prohibits choice by placing restrictions on public school
assignments or the transfer of students from one public school to another. 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(b)
(2005).
96 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i). Students may also be given the opportunity to transfer to
charter schools, virtual schools, or magnet schools. NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE, supra note 73,
at 13-14.
97 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(l)(E)(ii); NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 8. If there
are no eligible transfer schools within a district, that district must try, to the extent practicable, to
establish a cooperative agreement with neighboring districts to allow for interdistrict transfers. If
interdistrict transfers cannot be established, the district may offer supplemental services as a sub-
stitute for school choice during the first year of improvement. 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(h).
98 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(d).
99 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1 1).
[Vol. 108
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss1/10
2005] PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE UNDER NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 245
status. 1°° Districts must notify parents about the option to transfer before the
first day of school.' 1 The notice must be comprehensive, unbiased, and easy to
understand. 0 2  At a minimum, it must include information about eligibility,
transportation, and the performance and programs of available transfer
schools. 10 3 If more than one school in the district is meeting AYP, the district
must offer more than one transfer option to students.'"
4
Despite one representative's statement that public school choice was a
"noble compromise," other congressional members were left feeling that the
compromise ripped out "what [was] really the heart and core of the President's
Leave No Child Behind proposal"-private school choice. 105 While NCLB
certainly secured a victory for advocates of public school choice in the ongoing
debate about public school reform, 1°6 it is unclear if public school choice in its
configuration under NCLB was a victory for students trapped in persistently
underperforming schools. 10 7 Although it is still early in the implementation of
public school choice, it is apparent that in many districts across the country sub-
stantial obstacles are preventing the program from providing low-income stu-
dents with real and significant educational alternatives. 0 8 One study found that
100 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(13). Districts must spend at least 20% of Title I funds on public school
choice transportation and supplemental services. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(10). A minimum of 5%
must be reserved for each. If 20% is not enough to fully fund both programs, districts are not
required to spend more. Id. In deciding who should get the limited money, the district should
give priority to the lowest achieving students. Id. If districts do not need the full 20% to fill all
the requests for transportation and supplemental services, the remaining funds can be used else-
where. Id. Districts must allow students to stay in chosen schools until they complete the highest
grade available at the transfer school. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(13).
101 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(a)(2).
102 NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 11.
103 The district must also provide information about the receiving schools' facilities, parental
involvement opportunities, and teacher qualifications. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(6); 34 C.F.R. §
200.37(b)(4).
104 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(a)(4)(i).
1o5 147 CONG. REc. H2594 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) (statement of Rep. Owens).
106 Brownstein, supra note 17, at 213.
107 No studies have yet been conducted on the affect of public school choice under NCLB on
student achievement. GAO REPORT, supra note 72, at 17 n. 18. The Department of Education,
however, has contracted for an extensive study of NCLB that will examine the implementation of
many of the Act's key provisions, including school choice. Id. The report, which the Department
is referring to as the "National Longitudinal Study of No Child Left Behind," is expected to be
released in 2007. Id. Although the study is still in the design stages, the Department expects that
it will examine at least three areas concerning public school choice under NCLB: 1) the demo-
graphics of transferring and non-transferring students, 2) the reasons parents decide to transfer or
not transfer their eligible children and, 3) the effect of choice on the academic performance of
transferring students. Id. at 16-17. Thus far, currently available research shows that parents who
have available choices are consistently more pleased with school quality than parents who do not.
COMM'N ON CHOICE, supra note 31, at 20.
108 See GAO REPORT, supra note 72, at 18; CHOOSING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 31.
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in the 2003-2004 school year only 5.6% of eligible students requested transfers,
and of that number only 1.7% actually transferred. 109
C. Obstacles to Effective Implementation of Public School Choice under
NCLB
While it is clear that the effect of school choice often depends to a large
extent on the character and make-up of individual districts,' 10 common difficul-
ties have emerged in the implementation of the NCLB provisions."' In order
for students to benefit from public school choice, quality schools must be avail-
able for the choosing. Unfortunately, districts across the country are struggling
to provide students with this most basic requirement. 1 2 Obstacles to providing
meaningful transfer options arise primarily from two types of sources. First,
many districts are plagued with physical limitations. Population size, number of
available schools, and distance between those schools pose real barriers to in-
creasing educational options."I3 Secondly, NCLB's choice mandate has met
with administrative obstacles. The resistance or inattentiveness of administra-
tors charged with implementation of school choice seriously effects parental
interest and student transfer opportunities. 14
1. Physical Obstacles: Availability, Distance, and Capacity
Districts of all population sizes are finding themselves faced with a
sheer lack of high quality public schools within a reasonable driving distance to
offer as transfer options."1 5 In rural districts, there is often only one school
available for each grade level. 1 6 Thus, if, for example, the local elementary
school fails to meet AYP, there is simply no other school in the district, failing
or non-failing, 17 for elementary students to attend. In 2004, Kansas had seven-
teen such schools that were unable to offer choice. Further, approximately
ninety-percent of Nebraska districts currently have only one school per grade
109 CHOOSING BETrER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 37. Percentages are based on data collected
from 10 states and 53 districts in remaining states. Id. at 122 n.72.
10 COMM'N ON CHOICE, supra note 31, at 20.
III CHOOSING BETrER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 55-65.
112 Id. at 63-65.
13 See id. at 59-70.
114 Id. at 31-32, 55-59.
115 Brownstein, supra note 17, at 214.
116 Judith A. Winston, Rural Schools in America: Will No Child be Left Behind? The Elusive
Quest for Equal Educational Opportunities, 82 NEB. L. REv. 190,207 (2003).
17 NCLB itself does not use the term "failing" to refer to schools that miss AYP goals. Rather,
the Act labels those schools as "in need of improvement." The media, however, has "translated"
the latter designation to mean "failing." Ryan, supra note 4, at 945-46.
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level. 11 8 Urban areas face a different problem, but the result is the same. City
school districts contain many schools for each grade level but high concentra-
tions of low-income students and insufficient district resources frequently mean
that if one school is failing, the majority of them are also failing. 19
NCLB touches just briefly upon this problematic issue.120 The Act di-
rects districts, "to the extent practicable," to establish a cooperative transfer
agreement with higher performing neighboring districts when no schools of
choice are available within a student's district. 12' In addition, when an entire
school district is identified for improvement, NCLB gives states the option of
authorizing interdistrict transfers regardless of the existence or non-existence of
a cooperative agreement between two districts. 12  If districts are unable to effec-
tuate interdistrict transfers, schools may offer supplemental services in lieu of
transfer options during the first year of improvement status. 1
23
The precatory language of the statute which asks districts to act only "to
the extent practicable" and merely permits, but does not require the state to au-
thorize interdistrict transfers, has proven inadequate to ensure that students
locked in districts without options will have access to quality education.
124
Since the implementation of NCLB in 2002, only two districts in the entire
country reported transferring students across district lines. 125 Many more dis-
tricts made transfer requests of neighboring districts but were denied. 26 Al-
though a district is not permitted to use lack of capacity as a reason to deny stu-
dents the option to transfer to schools within its own boundaries, 127 other dis-tricts are not prohibited from denying out of district transfers for that reason. 128
118 CHOOSING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 64.
119 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania has eighteen available schools, yet during the 2003-2004 school
year, each of them was failing. Id. at 63.
120 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(11) (Supp. 112002).
121 Id. Districts may also enter in cooperative transfer agreements with charter schools or vir-
tual schools within the State. NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 17.
122 20 U.S.C. § 6316(c)(10)(C)(vii).
123 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(h)(2) (2005).
124 CHOOSING BETrER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 67.
125 In 2003-2004 in Northwest Arctic Borough, Alaska, two students transferred to another
village. Id. Airfare and boarding were provided by the district but the students remained in the
new school for only one semester. Id. New Haven, Connecticut included six interdistrict magnet
schools in its transfer offerings in 2003-2004. Id.
126 Id. at 68-69. For example, requests of Philadelphia, Chester-Upland, Orleans Parish, and
Richmond school districts to surrounding districts about the possibility of interdistrict transfers
were all rejected. Id. One North Carolina district refused to accept transfer students from
neighboring districts stating that to do so would "create an administrative nightmare." Id.
127 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(d). Lack of capacity and health and safety concerns-including over-
crowding problems-do not excuse a district from offering school choice. NON-REGULATORY
GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 14-16. The district is expected to create the additional capacity nec-
essary to comply with NCLB. Id.
128 See 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(d).
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Accordingly, many districts cite lack of capacity as an excuse to deny interdis-
trict transfers. 1
29
The shortage of quality transfer schools is not only a problem of capac-
ity but also one of administrative resistance. Principals and superintendents in
high performing, often suburban districts have shown an unwillingness to open
their doors to "refugees" from failing urban schools. 130 This demonstrated re-
luctance is likely caused by the lack of financial incentives,' 3 1 fears of over-
crowding and falling test scores, 32 and political resistance by suburban par-
ents. 13 3 Unwillingness of administrators in AYP proficient schools to accept
interdistrict transfers is particularly unfortunate because, in many areas of the
country, failing districts are comprised largely of minority and low-income stu-
dents whereas neighboring, suburban districts are populated mainly by affluent
white students.134 As a result, NCLB's choice provisions are doing very little to
upset the status quo; affluent families can buy property in quality school dis-
tricts, while families who are unable to foot the bill are relegated to more urban
areas in which schools are frequently underperforming. 1
35
This situation is unlikely to improve under the current regime. As the
one hundred percent proficiency deadline nears and schools are expected to
make greater and greater gains, the availability of transfer schools is likely to
worsen. Without requirements or incentives for suburban schools to accept
transfer students, it is probable that interdistrict transfers will not become a vi-
able remedy to alleviate the increasing pressure to provide school choice op-
tions.
129 The superintendent of Dayton, Ohio schools reported that his request for interdistrict trans-
fers was denied by over a dozen neighboring school districts, most of which cited lack of capacity
as the reason for their denial. Brownstein, supra note 17, at 214. Despite the prohibition against
using lack of capacity to deny transfers, many districts including Long Beach, Los Angeles, Chi-
cago, Atlantic City, Providence, and Richmond continue to do so. CHOOSING BETTER SCHOOLS,
supra note 18, at 62-63. Those districts that have heeded the prohibition, such as New York City
and Portland, Oregon, have faced complaints about overcrowding and increased class sizes. Id.
130 Brownstein, supra note 17, at 214.
131 Generally, Title I funding is allocated to individual schools according to a count of low-
income children residing in a school's attendance area. NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE, supra note
73, at 21 (citing Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1113, 115 Stat. 1425, 1469-71 (2002) (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 6313)). Funding may follow transfer students if the students are transferring to a Title I
school and the district has chosen to allocate money on an enrollment basis rather than an atten-
dance area basis. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 11 13(b)(1)(B), 115 Stat. 1425, 1470 (2002)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6313(b)(1)(B)). However, Title I funding may not follow transfer stu-
dents to non-Title I schools. Id. Schools in more affluent districts, therefore, may not meet the
poverty threshold required to receive Title-I funds and thus have no monetary incentive to accept
low-income transfer students.
132 Zamora, supra note 3, at 441-42.
133 James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J.
2043,2046(2002).
134 CHOOSING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 67.
135 Ryan & Heise, supra note 133, at 2047.
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2. Administrative Obstacles: Notification, Information, and Active
Resistance
No Child Left Behind has been met with a great deal of opposition from
teachers and administrators in schools across the country. 136 Many local educa-
tors view NCLB's improvement goals as unrealistic and resent being forced to
implement school choice penalties that amount to "a public confession of fail-
ure" when students are unable to meet those goals. 137 In a recent educational
survey, teachers in both passing and failing schools overwhelmingly disagreed
with the proposition that public school choice will lead low-performing schools
to improve.138 As a result of this opposition, school choice under NCLB, which
relies largely on the efforts of educators for promotion and implementation, has
been unenthusiastically supported, ignored, and even actively discouraged. 1
39
Relying on schools to actively implement reforms that challenge their
own "bureaucratic self-interests" is inherently difficult. 140 Many school officials
view school choice as a threat to the integrity and reputation of their school.
14 1
Educators who have dedicated their professional lives to teaching are not eager
to notify the public that their school has failed to meet progress goals, particu-
larly now that teachers and administrators stand to lose their jobs if AYP con-
tinues to go unmet. 42 In order for a school choice program to be successful,
parents and students must be aware that transfer options are available. Under
NCLB, district administrators are required to notify parents of available transfer
136 The National Education Association's ("NEA") website compiles what it terms the "grow-
ing chorus of voices" against NCLB, http://www.nea.org/esea/chorusl.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2005). One of the main points of contention is the allegation that NCLB is an "unfunded man-
date"-a law that imposes responsibilities upon states without allocating sufficient funds to cover
the costs of implementing those responsibilities. See id. On August 22, 2005, Connecticut be-
came the first state to sue the federal government over the No Child Left Behind Act. Complaint
at 1, Conn. v. Spellings, Civ. Action No. 305CV1320 (D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.npr.org/ documents/2005/aug/ct-nclbsuit.pdf. In its complaint, Connecticut alleges
that the "[Secretary of Education] is requiring Connecticut to expend substantial sums in excess of
federal funding to comply with NCLB mandates." Id. at 8.
137 See William L. Taylor, Title I as an Instrument for Achieving Desegregation and Equal
Educational Opportunity, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1751, 1759 (2003).
138 GAIL L. SUNDERMAN ET AL., LISTENING TO TEACHERS: CLASSROOM REALITIES AND No CHILD
LEFT BEHIND 31-32 (2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/re-
searchiarticles/NCLBSurveyReport.pdf. The "Teacher's Voice" survey conducted by the Har-
vard Civil Rights Project polled teachers in two districts--one in Fresno, CA and one in Rich-
mond, VA. Id. at 12. These districts were selected because they represent different regions,
demographics, and state educational policies. Id. at 13. Overall, 75.6% of Fresno teachers in
failing schools and 81% of Fresno teachers in passing schools felt that school choice would not
cause low-performing schools to improve. Id. at 31-32.
139 See Brownstein, supra note 17, at 215.
140 See id.
14, See id.
142 See generally id.
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options when a school fails to meet AYP for two or more consecutive years. 143
At a minimum, the notice must explain the option to transfer, provide informa-
tion about the academic achievement of the available transfer school(s), and
notify parents that transportation will be paid for or provided by the district.44
Distributing accurate and comprehensive information is critical to the operation
of school choice. If parents are unaware or unsure, they cannot make intelligent
decisions about the direction of their child's education. In the face of a lack of
information, parents may forego a beneficial opportunity or may inadvertently
choose a transfer school that is less appropriate for their child's educational
needs. 145
Because NCLB depends on school officials to implement and promote
school choice, many parents remain uninformed or underinformed. In fact, a
recent study by the Harvard Civil Rights project revealed that seventy-five per-
cent of parents in Buffalo, New York were not aware that their child was attend-
ing a school identified for improvement. 146 Despite the resolute stance of the
contents and language of NCLB's penalty provisions, the reality of the matter
may be that those districts that choose to flout the Act's notice and information
requirements will meet with little, if any, repercussion. NCLB's enforcement
scheme is surprisingly weak. The statute vests the sole discretionary power to
penalize violations of NCLB in the head of the Department of Education, 47 a
government agency that some commentators assert has been plagued by "a cul-
ture of non-enforcement" in recent years. 148 While virtually all districts have
143 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(6) (Supp. II 2002). Districts must also notify parents of: the reasons
their child's school failed to meet AYP, how the school compares in academic achievement to
other district schools, what the state, district, and school are doing to address the problem, and
ways in which parents can become involved. Id. If the school is required to offer supplemental
educational services, the district must send a notice explaining the availability of these services as
well. 34 C.F.R. § 200.37(b)(5) (2005).
144 34 C.F.R. § 200.37(b)(4).
145 Because schools under NCLB are ranked by trend rather than absolute score, sometimes
transfer schools have a lower test average than sending schools because the transfer school was
making gains from a lower base. Brownstein, supra note 17, at 218. This type of information is
critical to parental decision-making.
146 JIMMY KiM & GAIL L. SUNDERMAN, FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST PHASE OF SCHOOL CHOICE
IMPLEMENTATION IN THREE DISTRICTS: BUFFALO, NEW YORK, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, DEKALB
COUNTY, GEORGIA 12 (The Civil Rights Project, Harvard University, Working Draft, 2003),
http://www.okea.org/ESEA/actionresources/CivilRights Choice.pdf.
147 The Secretary of Education may withhold federal funds from states that violate NCLB's
requirements. 20 U.S.C. § 631 l(g)(2). No enforcement scheme is available however, to penalize
the violations of individual districts. ACORN v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338, 346
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 6312(a)(l)(b)(e)). For a discussion of the problems
caused by the lack of enforcement mechanisms see infra Part IV.B.
148 Taylor, supra note 137, at 1759-60; see also Closing the Achievement Gap in America's Pub-
lic Schools: The No Child Left Behind Act: Hearing Before the House Committee on Education
and the Workforce, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Kati Haycock, Director, The Education
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sent out some form of notice to families concerning school choice options, many
districts sent late, 149 incomplete, or overtly discouraging letters. 150 Because stu-
dents cannot benefit from school choice if parents do not have the knowledge
necessary to make informed choices, transfer rates are unlikely to improve if the
notice and information requirements are not enforced. Even the most well in-
tentioned districts, if left unchecked, may neglect to adequately inform parents
as the 2014 deadline approaches and priorities shift toward attempting to raise
achievement levels to one hundred percent.15"
IV. REMOVING OBSTACLES: CREATING MEANINGFUL PUBLIC SCHOOL
TRANSFER OPTIONS
"There must be a moment in which parents can say, 'I've had enough of
this school.' Parents must be given real options in the face offailure in order to
make sure reform is meaningful. ,1
52
In order for NCLB to fulfill its promise to provide significant educa-
tional opportunities to low-income students trapped in underperforming schools,
the supply and promotion of quality choices must be increased. The remaining
portion of this Article discusses potential remedies for both the physical and
administrative limitations that NCLB school choice is currently facing.
Trust) ("[A] lot of good will has been squandered and momentum undercut by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education's mishandling of [NCLB] .... For the first two and half years after NCLB was
enacted, the Department refused to exert any authority at all over the states' implementation. The
Department did not ask for and did not review state definitions or plans. Guidance from the De-
partment has been erratic and inconsistent -- both across states and over time.").
149 Many districts notified parents too close to the first day of school, giving them a very short
time to make a decision about transferring their child. CHOOSING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18,
at 58.
150 Department of Education guidance provides that districts may not impede parents' opportu-
nities to exercise school choice by making the process difficult or inconvenient. NON-
REGULATORY GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 12. As an example, the guidance states that "parents
should not have to appear in person to state their choices." Id. A number of districts have disre-
garded the Department's guidance by requiring parents to call the school principal or make an
appointment in order to exercise choice. CHOOSING BETrER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 58. Other
districts have attempted to discourage choice through correspondence. One letter from an Akron,
Ohio public school emphasized to parents that "transportation to the new school is your responsi-
bility" even though transportation is supposed to be provided by the district. Id. (emphasis in
original). Another letter, from the Superintendent of schools in Woonsocket, Rhode Island,
stated: "While I am required to make this well-intentioned program [choice] available to your
child, please be advised that I have serious reservations about the implied benefits for your child."
Id.
151 Currently, most states have made public school choice implementation a low priority and
have provided little assistance to districts or parents. Id. at 10.
152 Remarks on Signing the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in Hamilton, Ohio, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 23, 25 (Jan. 8, 2002).
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A. Addressing Physical Obstacles: Mandating Interdistrict Choice
Within the confines of NCLB's public school choice program, the most
obvious solution to a lack of genuine transfer options can be found just across
district lines. Low-income students attending schools that serve large, concen-
trated low-income populations consistently perform worse on achievement tests
than those low-income students who attend schools that serve a wealthier popu-
lation.153 Currently, a weak interdistrict transfer policy is preventing many low-
income students from obtaining access to real educational opportunities, which
often lie in more affluent outlying districts.1 54 To help dispel the debilitating
reluctance of these neighboring districts to accept transfer students, Congress
should create a combination of financial and academic incentives for those dis-
tricts to do so.
For instance, NCLB compensates for intradistrict choice by permitting
allocation of Title I funds on an enrollment basis between schools within a dis-
trict. 155 The Act does not, however, consider student enrollment for purposes of
determining the size of Title I grants to the districts themselves. 56 As a result,
neighboring districts have no financial incentive to accept transfer students be-
cause the federal per pupil money, which is allocated according to population,
remains with the sending district. 57  Additionally, NCLB prohibits Title I
money from following transfer students to non-Title I schools, 58 the type of
wealthy suburban school that low-income students would most benefit from
attending. 59 Under the current allocation scheme, would-be receiving schools
have a financial disincentive to accepting transfer students because such stu-
dents come without additional federal funding and put a strain on the school's
existing resources.
60
As a way to encourage interdistrict transfer options, Congress should
revise NCLB to permit states to reserve a portion of Title I funding before allo-
cating it to the districts for the purpose of providing grants to those schools that
153 Zamora, supra note 3, at 414. "Lower-income students performed their worst at schools
where the student population was overwhelmingly poor. But when lower-income students at-
tended schools where most of the students were more affluent, they achieved higher scores --
matching or exceeding the county average." Brigid Schulte & Dan Keating, Pupils' Poverty
Drives Achievement Gap, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2001, at Al.
154 See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1 1) (Supp. II 2002). Districts need only try "to the extent practica-
ble" to establish a cooperative agreement with neighboring districts. Id.
155 20 U.S.C. § 6313(b)(1)(B).
156 20 U.S.C. § 6333(c). District grant amounts are determined by reference to the most recent
population data available from the Department of Commerce. Id. Districts are allocated money
according to the number of low-income children populating each district. Id.
157 Id.
158 NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 21.
159 See Ryan & Heise, supra note 133, at 2045-46.
160 See 20 U.S.C. § 6333(c).
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accept interdistrict transfers. 16' The size of each grant should be determined by
the number of interdistrict transfer students attending a particular school. Non-
Title I schools should not be excluded from receiving such grants because those
wealthier and largely suburban schools are precisely the ones whose participa-
tion is key to the success of a nationwide public school choice program. 62 Fur-
ther, to alleviate legitimate concerns that an influx of students from lower-
performing schools will jeopardize the ability of high-performing schools to
meet their own AYP goals, Congress should create an AYP grace period of one
or two years. 163 In this period, transfer student scores would be measured for
research purposes but exempted from the count toward an individual school's
AYP. In this way, receiving schools will not be as discouraged from accepting
students because they will be provided with a buffer time period in which to
improve the performance of transfer students.
Creating both a grace period and a financial incentive for receiving
schools may quell a significant amount of overt opposition toward interdistrict
transfers. Yet, in some areas of the country, nothing shy of a legal mandate
would convince privileged schools to open their doors to urban children. 164
Requiring districts to accept transfer students from across district lines is likely
to be politically unpopular among suburbanites who wield a great deal of politi-165
cal power. Suburban parents are generally pleased with the education their
children receive in local public schools and fear that school choice would un-
dermine the "physical and financial sanctity" of these neighborhood schools.
166
Because school choice may threaten the "exclusivity and superiority" of subur-
ban schools, suburbanites are likely to oppose "any changes to the status quo
that might upset [their] advantaged position.' 67 However, in order to achieve
the lofty goals of No Child Left Behind, it is imperative that the program not be
allowed to falter on the shoals of apathy, resistance, or political discomfort.
Congress should work to pass a provision that would require availability of in-
terdistrict transfer options when there are no available schools to choose from
on an intradistrict level. 168 The provision should require states to ensure that
school choice is available to those students stuck in districts where there are no
available transfer opportunities because all possible schools are failing.
161 Currently, NCLB allows states to reserve a portion of Title I funds to cover administrative
and school improvement costs and to help fund new districts and charter schools. 20 U.S.C. §
6303(a).
162 Ryan & Heise, supra note 133, at 2135 (noting that suburbanites constitute the largest ob-
stacle to increasing opportunities for choice).
163 See CHOOSING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 14.
164 Generous payments failed to induce suburban districts in Milwaukee and St. Louis to open
their doors to more than a handful of struggling students. Ryan & Heise, supra note 133, at 2126.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 2045.
167 Id. at 2045, 2135.
168 CHOOSING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 14.
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B. Addressing Administrative Obstacles: Litigating NCLB under §1983
Lax enforcement of spending conditions has repeatedly and seriously
hampered the effect of the ESEA and its various revisions.1 69 For instance, when
NCLB was enacted in 2002, only nineteen states were in compliance with the
standards and assessment systems mandated just six years earlier by its prede-
cessor revision, the Improving America's Schools Act. 7° On its face, NCLB
promises much tighter accountability, yet it explicitly creates no judicial or ad-
ministrative procedures to ensure the enforcement of its strict provisions.
71
Instead, the Act falls back on the typical remedy for noncompliance with Spend-
ing Clause legislation 72 by providing the Secretary of Education with the au-
thority to terminate funds for violations of the Act. 73 Under NCLB, however,
"a funds cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences to the supposed
beneficiaries of the Act.' '174 Resorting to what one commentator called "the
blunt and seldom-used club" of withholding federal funds 175 would cripple those
low-income schools that the Act was passed to assist. Parents are left in the
untenable position of wanting to push for compliance yet not wanting the gov-
ernment to revoke the Title I funds that provide necessary resources for their
children's education. In order to force recalcitrant districts and administrators to
comply with NCLB's choice mandates, parents and students should be able to
turn to the courts for assistance. The availability of a private cause of action for
violation of NCLB's choice provisions would empower parents to seek more
appropriate remedies and to free their children from persistently underperform-
ing schools. This article argues that civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. §1983 is the
most appropriate and viable cause of action available to enforce public school
choice under NCLB 76
169 Zamora, supra note 3, at 431.
170 SUNDERMAN, supra note 31 at 6.
171 See infra notes 257, 259.
172 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981) ("[Tlhe typical remedy
for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for
noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.").
173 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g) (Supp. II 2002).
174 Sasha Samberg-Champion, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a Coherent Section
1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1838, 1859 n.141 (2003) (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S.
at 52 (White, J., dissenting)).
175 Id. at 1839.
176 Over the years, education litigation has taken numerous forms. Suits in tort, contract, prop-
erty, and constitutional law have all been attempted by parents filing educational malpractice
claims. See Melanie Natasha Henry, Comment, No Child Left Behind? Educational Malpractice
Litigation for the 21" Century, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1127 (2004). For the most part, however,
courts have largely rejected these claims. See id.
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1. Introduction to §1983
Section 1983, enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, is "the basic ve-
hicle for federal court review of alleged state and local violations of federal
law."' 77 It provides a private cause of action against any person who, under the
color of state law, abridges "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws" of the United States. 178 The statute confers no substan-
tive rights but rather bestows a remedy by empowering federal courts to prevent
and redress violations of federal law. 7 9 Under §1983, a right conferred by a
federal statute is presumed to be privately enforceable. 180 In order to take ad-
vantage of this presumption, a plaintiff must first assert a violation of a federal
right rather than merely a violation of federal law.' 81 Courts have traditionally
examined three factors in determining whether a particular statutory provision
gives rise to an individual federal right: 1) "Congress must have intended that
the provision in question benefit the plaintiff;" 2) "the right assertedly protected
by the statute [must not be] so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement
would strain judicial competence;" and 3) "the statute must unambiguously im-
pose a binding obligation on the States.' 182 Once a federal right is established,
the presumption of enforceability can be rebutted only by showing that Con-
177 ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 466 (4th ed. 2003). The language of the stat-
ute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
178 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Until 1980 there was a good deal of debate concerning whether §1983
could be used to remedy violations of federal statutory rights at all. Bradford C. Mank, Suing
Under §1983: The Future After Gonzaga University v. Doe, 39 Hous. L. REV. 1417, 1433 (2003).
In 1871, when § 1983 was first created, the language of the statute only explicitly referred to en-
forcement of constitutional rights. Id. at 1427. It was not until three years later that Congress
amended the section to include the words "and laws." Id. Commentators generally took one of
three divergent interpretations of the amendment: 1) that Congress meant only to clarify, not mod-
ify the available action and thus the only enforceable rights are constitutional ones; 2) that Con-
gress intended the only enforceable "laws" to be civil rights laws; or 3) that Congress intended to
allow a private remedy for any federal law. Id. at 1427-28. The Supreme Court brought an end to
this dispute in 1980 when it held that the plain meaning of "and laws" provided a remedy for all
federal statutes that confer rights on individuals. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980).
179 CHEMERINKSY, supra note 177, at 470.
180 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002).
181 Id. at 283 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997)).
182 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41.
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gress specifically or impliedly foreclosed use of §1983 as a remedy under the
statute in question. 
83
For approximately the past twenty years, the United States Supreme
Court has vacillated between broad and narrow conceptions of the types of
rights that are capable of invoking the protection of a §1983 cause of action.' M
In 2002, the Court decided Gonzaga University v. Doe, the latest installment in
a progression of § 1983 cases that Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted are not
"models of clarity."'' 85 The issue in Gonzaga concerned the enforceability of the
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA") under §1983. Upon
graduation from Gonzaga University, John Doe applied for a teaching position
at a local elementary school. 186 As part of the application process, the school
required all new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral character from the
dean of their graduating college. 87 A university official overheard one student
tell another of sexual misconduct by John Doe.' 88 After contacting the state
agency responsible for teacher certification and openly discussing these allega-
tions, the university refused to provide Doe with the requisite affidavit. 189 Doe
sued Gonzaga and the university official for violating FERPA, a federal law that
prohibits federally funded educational institutions from releasing educational
records to unauthorized persons. 190 A jury awarded Doe $150,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages on the FERPA claim. 191 The
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the jury award and ruled, like every fed-
eral court of appeals to consider the question, that §1983 could be used to en-
force FERPA.' 92
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that FERPA is un-
enforceable under § 1983 because it does not confer a federal right in "clear and
unambiguous terms.' ' 193 The Court explained that the Act simply prohibits fed-
eral funding from aiding schools with the "policy or practice" of releasing con-
fidential student information. 194 Because students like John Doe are merely
within the "general zone of interest" that FERPA was intended to protect, the
183 Id. at 341 (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994)).
184 See Mank, supra note 178, at 1433.
185 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 278.




190 Id. at 278-79.
191 Id. at 277.
192 Id. at 299 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "all of the Federal Courts of Appeals ex-
pressly deciding the question have concluded that FERPA creates federal rights enforceable under
§ 1983").
193 Id. at 290-91.
194 Id. at 288.
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Court concluded that the Act does not confer individual student entitlement to
confidentiality. 95 The Court stated that the text of a statute must be "phrased in
terms of the persons benefited" in order to confer private federal rights. 196 The
majority directed lower courts to adopt an implied right of action approach to
the creation of enforceable rights inquiry under § 1983.197 While acknowledging
that unlike implied cause of action claimants §1983 claimants need not prove
congressional intent to create a private remedy, the Court rejected the notion
that the initial inquiry-whether a statute confers any right at all-is any differ-
ent in either analysis: "Both inquiries simply require a determination as to
whether or not Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a class of
beneficiaries."' 98 Accordingly, the Court noted that "where the text and struc-
ture of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new indi-
vidual rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under §1983 or under
an implied right of action."'
199
Notwithstanding Rehnquist's promise in Gonzaga to "resolve any am-
biguity' 2°° in the Court's §1983 precedent, at best the opinion creates another
layer of uncertainty. Legislative history has long played a role in determining
congressional intent to confer an individual federal right in both §1983 and im-
plied right of action contexts.2°' Yet, the majority's heavy emphasis on the text
of FERPA seems to threaten the use of legislative history to determine if a fed-
eral statute creates an individual right. Because of Gonzaga, it remains uncer-
tain whether "clear" and "unambiguous" evidence of "congressional intent" to
establish an individual right is limited to an examination of statutory text or if
legislative history may be considered.20 2 This unclarity has serious ramifica-
tions for parents seeking to enforce school choice obligations under NCLB. At
worst, some commentators fear, it effectively eliminates the private cause of
action as a method of enforcing state compliance with federal spending man-
195 Id. at 283, 287-88.
196 Id. at 284 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13 (1979)).
197 Id. at 283.
198 Id. at 285.
199 Id. at 286.
200 Id. at 278.
201 See Mank, supra note 178, at 1469 n.357; Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S 174, 179
(1988) (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) ("In
determining whether to infer a private cause of action from a federal statute, our focal point is
Congress' intent in enacting the statute . . . . '[l]ntent may appear implicitly in the language or
structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enactment."'); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694 (the
Cort analysis for determining if a private right of action may be implied "requires consideration of
legislative history"); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 515 (1990) ("Any doubt that Con-
gress intended [to create enforceable rights under §1983] ... is quickly dispelled by a review of
the legislative history of the Boren Amendment."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) ("the legislative history buttresses our conclusion" that Congress intended
to confer enforceable rights).
202 See Mank, supra note 178, at 1421.
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dates such as NCLB.2 °3 At least one district court has taken the majority's nar-
row emphasis on statutory language as an instruction to look no further than the
text of the school choice provisions of the Act when determining whether Con-
gress "intended that the provision[s] in question benefit the plaintiff. ' '204 As a
result, that court held that § 1983 is unavailable as a remedy under NCLB. The
following section is a summary of that court's decision and its application of
Gonzaga to NCLB. Section three then analyzes the decision of the district court
and argues for a more narrow interpretation of Gonzaga's effect on the avail-
ability of § 1983 causes of action.
2. ACORN v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.
20 5
In 2003, parents of New York City schoolchildren filed the first suit
concerning compliance with the newly enacted NCLB.2 °6  Brought under
§ 1983, the suit alleged that local and state officials in the Albany School District
and the New York City Department of Education failed to comply with NCLB's
public school choice and supplemental services ("SES") mandates.2 °7 Specifi-
cally, the parents claimed that the defendant school districts violated parental
notification requirements by providing either no school choice information, un-
timely information, or information that was inaccurate and misleading.20 8 Fur-
ther, the plaintiffs presented evidence that even when parents managed to file
legitimate transfer requests, the districts violated NCLB by outright rejecting the
vast majority of applications.209 The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction
203 Gonzaga suggests, but does not explicitly say, that rights created under Spending Clause
legislation are somehow different from rights conferred under other congressional powers. "Since
Pennhurst, only twice have we found spending legislation to give rise to enforceable rights."
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.
204 ACORN v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y 2003) (finding that
NCLB's school choice provisions do not confer enforceable federal rights). Outside of the school
choice context, one other district court has held that provisions of NCLB do not confer enforce-
able federal fights. Fresh Start Academy v. Toledo Board of Educ., 363 F. Supp. 2d 910, 916
(N.D. Ohio 2005) (denying relief to supplemental service provider that alleged misappropriation
of NCLB funds because NCLB does not confer an enforceable right on SES providers).
205 269 F. Supp. 2d 338. Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
("ACORN") "is the nation's largest community organization of low- and moderate-income fami-
lies, working together for social justice and stronger communities." About ACORN,
http://www.acom.org (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
206 ACORN, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 339. Since ACORN was decided only three other cases have
addressed challenges under NCLB. Coachella Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal., 2005 WL
1869499, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2005) (rejecting challenge under NCLB to lack of testing
accommodations for students with limited English proficiency because plaintiffs failed to state a
federal question); Fresh Start Academy, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 911; Kegerreis v. U.S., 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18012, at *6-7 (D. Kan. Oct. 9, 2003) (rejecting challenge to the constitutionality of
NCLB because plaintiff lacked standing).
207 A CORN, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
208 Id. at 343.
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to force the districts to send out adequate notices immediately, to provide le-
gitimate transfer options, and to prevent the districts from improperly diverting
Title I money.21°
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied the plaintiffs' request for an injunction.2 1 Specifically, the court found
that NCLB is not enforceable under § 1983. The court cited three reasons for its
holding that NCLB is privately unenforceable.1 2 First, the court concluded that
the Act lacks the "necessary rights creating language" to support entitlement to
213individual enforcement. In step with the exclusively textualist approach of
the United States Supreme Court's majority opinion in Gonzaga, the court
stated that "'if Congress wishes to create new rights ... it must do so in clear
and unambiguous terms. ,,,2 4 Because the language of NCLB's choice pro-
visions is framed to focus on what states and districts "must provide" rather than
what parents and students are entitled to, the court concluded that Congress did
not intend to create a personal right to school choice. 15
Second, the court found that like FERPA, the statute at issue in Gon-
zaga, NCLB has an "aggregate focus. ' 216 Because the transfer provisions give
priority to low-income students as a group, the court reasoned that Congress
created NCLB's transfer and SES provisions to benefit children collectively,
rather than individually.21 7 Therefore, the court concluded that NCLB is not
concerned with "'whether the needs of any particular person have been satis-
fied"' and cannot give rise to individual rights.2 |8
Finally, the court noted that the "nature of the enforcement mecha-
nisms" in NCLB indicate that Congress did not intend to create individual
rights.219 Because the Act gives the Secretary of Education sole enforcement
authority, the court concluded that Congress intended to centralize enforcement
in order to avoid the hazards of conflicting interpretations that might arise from
individual lawsuits. 220 Therefore, the court held, parents and students cannot
judicially enforce the provisions of NCLB in a § 1983 action.221
209 Id.
210 Id at 339.
211 Id. at 347.
212 Id. at 344-46.
213 Id. at 344, 347.
214 Id. at 344 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002)).
215 Id. at 344-45.




220 Id. at 347.
221 Id.
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3. Making Room for NCLB in § 1983 after Gonzaga University v.
Doe
Despite the conclusion of the district court in ACORN, arguably
NCLB's choice provisions do and should confer individually enforceable rights.
In considering the potential enforceability of NCLB choice, the most pressing
unclarity created by Gonzaga is whether an examination of congressional intent
requires a strictly textual approach or whether a "consideration of legislative
history is permitted., 22 2 Justices Breyer and Souter, in their concurring opinion,
explicitly rejected an approach to §1983 that would require sole reliance on the
text of a congressional Act:
[T]he statute books are too many, the laws too diverse, and their
purposes too complex, for any single legal formula to offer
more than general guidance. I would not, in effect, predeter-
mine an outcome through the use of a presumption-such as the
majority's presumption that a right is conferred only if set forth
"unambiguously" in the statute's "text and structure." 223
Although their concern is well founded, Justices Breyer and Souter likely over-
stated the extent of the majority's reliance on a textualist approach.224 The
Court in Gonzaga never explicitly stated that the "clear and unambiguous" in-
tent required to confer an individual right must be found in the language of the
statute alone.225 In fact, while the Court's opinion largely focused on the text
and structure of FERPA to determine congressional intent to create a right, the
majority did briefly consider legislative history.226 Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist quoted a joint statement from the congressional record to buttress the
conclusion that FERPA does not confer enforceable rights.227 While Gonzaga is
undoubtedly capable of a narrow interpretation that forecloses the use of legisla-
tive history in an enforceable rights inquiry, a broader interpretation of the case
is more reasonable and consistent with § 1983 jurisprudence.228
The Court in Gonzaga denied relief to John Doe because he failed to
prove the first factor of the test that federal courts use to determine whether a
222 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273; Mank, supra note 178, at 1421.
223 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 291 (Breyer, J., concurring).
224 See Mank supra, note 178, at 1471.
225 Id.
226 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290 (citing a joint statement of the congressional record to support the
conclusion that Congress created a centralized review provision in FERPA due to "concern that
regionalizing the enforcement of [FERPA] may lead to multiple interpretations of it, and possibly
work a hardship on parents, students, and institutions.").
227 Id.
228 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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statute confers an individual right-"Congress must have intended that the pro-
vision in question benefit the plaintiff., 229 The district court in ACORN read
Gonzaga as a restriction on the type of evidence that can be used to prove what
Congress "must have intended., 230 A better reading, however, is that the Court
meant to restrict not evidence of congressional intent but rather the type of
"benefit" that is sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as an enforceable
right. The Court adamantly rejected interpretations of its precedent that have
permitted plaintiffs to recover under §1983 when they merely fall within the
11 ~23general zone of interest" that a statute was intended to protect.231 The Court
emphasized that only "rights, not the broader or vaguer 'benefits' or 'interests'
may be enforced under the authority of § 1983.232 Although the Court stated
that Congress must speak with a "clear and unambiguous" voice to confer a
federal right, nothing in the opinion barred courts from listening to the congres-
sional voice that is recorded in legislative history.233 The Court in Gonzaga did
not deny relief to the plaintiff because of an oversight by Congress to fully re-
cord its "clear and unambiguous" intent within the text of the Act.234 Rather, the
plaintiffs claim in Gonzaga failed because the benefit Congress intended to
confer under FERPA was not specific and individual enough to rise to the level
of a federal right.235
Unlike the statute at issue in Gonzaga, NCLB confers a federal right
rather than merely a federal benefit.236 The district court in ACORN, interpret-
ing Gonzaga narrowly, began and ended its inquiry into the requisite congres-
sional intent with the text of NCLB's choice provisions.237 Had the court delved
deeper, however, it would have discovered legislative history supportive of a
congressional intent to confer individual entitlement to school choice under
NCLB.238 Indeed, the choice provisions in NCLB were meant to "empower[]
parents" by "moving accountability" away from the Department of Education,
Washington, and the State capitals.239 By mandating public school choice, Con-
gress intended to put decision-making power "around the kitchen table, where
parents can make the decision as to what school ... meets the needs of their
229 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 282-90.
230 See ACORN v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344-48 (S.D.N.Y 2003).
231 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283.
232 Id. (emphasis in original).
233 See supra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
234 See generally Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273.
235 Id. at 287-90.
236 See Henry, supra note 176, at 1158-66; Sarah D. Greenberger, Note, Enforceable Rights, No
Child Left Behind, and Political Patriotism: A Case for Open-Minded Section 1983 Jurispru-
dence, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1011, 1028 (2005).
237 See ACORN v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y 2003).
238 See infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
239 147 CONG. REC. H2591 (May 23, 2001) (statement of Rep. Hoekstra).
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children." 240 NCLB choice was enacted to create a "safety valve" and a "life
preserver" for individual students trapped in persistently failing schools. 241  In
this way, the choice provisions were not meant to apply simply on a level of
institutional policy and practice, but rather were meant to focus on providing
individual students with educational options. In light of the goals of NCLB
choice, it is illogical to deny parents of schoolchildren the power to enforce
NCLB's choice provisions merely because the explicit language of the statute
speaks in terms of what "the local educational agency shall . . .provide
' 242
rather than what "parents shall receive.,
243
In addition, although the context and legislative history of NCLB pro-
vides the clearest indication that Congress intended to confer a federal right to
school choice, NCLB is not entirely devoid of the type of "rights creating lan-
guage" emphasized by the Court in Gonzaga.24 Indeed, the popular title of the
Act itself, "No Child Left Behind," indicates that the statutory scheme was de-
signed to provide each and every student with quality educational opportuni-
240 Id.
241 See Empowering Success: Flexibility and School Choice: Before the Committee on Educa-
tion and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 63 (2001) (testimony of Clint Bolick, Litigation Director,
Institute for Justice) [hereinafter Bolick]; Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services,
Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2002: Before Labor-HHS-Education Appro-
priations Subcommittee, 107th Cong. 755 (2001) (testimony of John A. Boehner) [hereinafter
Boehner].
242
[T]he local educational agency shall, not later than the first day of the school
year following such identification, provide all students enrolled in the school
with the option to transfer to another public school served by the local educa-
tional agency, which may include a public charter school, that has not been
identified for school improvement under this paragraph, unless such an option
is prohibited by State law.
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(l)(E) (Supp. II 2002).
243 One commentator has noted that if Congress frames statutory language in terms of what
parents must receive then the statute will not clearly allocate responsibility for carrying out that
mandate. Henry, supra note 176, at 1161. If Congress wants parents to receive an opportunity, it
is natural that it would specify a particular person or entity to provide that opportunity. Id. Title
IV, the example of a rights-creating statute cited by the majority in Gonzaga, is fundamentally
different than NCLB and many other potentially rights-conferring statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(2000). Title IV confers a negative right-the right not to be discriminated against by any entity
receiving federal funds. Id. NCLB, however, confers a positive right-the right to transfer. See
20 U.S.C. § 6316. Title IV does not require any specific action or implementation, but NCLB
requires a good deal of both. In order to ensure that parents and students receive their right to
transfer under NCLB, Congress necessarily had to affirmatively confer the responsibility for im-
plementation onto a specific entity.
244 Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Gonzaga that the sort of "no person shall" rights
creating language envisioned by the Court has never been present in § 1983 cases. Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 297 (2002). For the sake of argument, however, notes 246-48 and the ac-
companying text point to such rights-creating language in NCLB.
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ties.245 Further, NCLB provides that students who choose to transfer "shall be
enrolled in classes and other activities in the public school ... in the same man-
ner as all other children at the public school., 246 Also, school districts are re-
quired to provide prompt notice and "explanation of the parents' option to trans-
fer.
247
The district court in ACORN concluded from the text of the choice pro-
visions that Congress had no intent to confer an individual right to choice be-
cause NCLB has an "aggregate focus." While it is true that NCLB as a whole is
meant to have an aggregate impact in order to "improve[] the academic
achievement of all students, '248 the choice provisions of the Act have a nar-
rower, more individualized purpose. First, unlike the whole of the Act which is
aimed at comprehensive education reform, NCLB's school choice provisions
were designed to provide an escape valve for individual children. 249 By enact-
ing broad accountability, teaching and testing requirements, Congress clearly
recognized that choice would not be a panacea for public education as a whole.
Rather, the Act treats choice as an individualized solution, specifically focusing
on how to ensure that primarily low-income students trapped in failing schools
receive a meaningful education.250 Further, unlike the nondisclosure provisions
in FERPA, which only required "substantial compliance" or "reasonable ef-
forts" in order for educational institutions to continue to receive funding,251 the
transfer provisions of NCLB require strict adherence.252 The fact that FERPA
does not require nondisclosure in every instance provided further support for the
Gonzaga Court's conclusion that FERPA has only an aggregate focus. 5 3 Under
NCLB, however, partial performance is insufficient: "[Tihe local educational
agency shall ... provide all students enrolled in the school [identified for im-
provement] with the option to transfer to another public school .... ,254 Be-
cause school choice is "'couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms,"'
255
students have a right to transfer options under the Act.
245 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the title of FERPA, The
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, indicates that the entire statutory scheme was de-
signed to protect individual rights).
246 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(F).
247 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(6)(F) (emphasis added).
248 20 U.S.C. § 6301(4) (emphasis added).
249 See Bolick & Boehner, supra note 241.
250 Id.
251 FERPA only requires that funding recipients "comply substantially" with the Act. Gon-
zaga, 536 U.S. at 288.
252 See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
253 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288.
254 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(E)(i) (emphasis added).
255 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 282 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997)).
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The court in ACORN also concluded that because NCLB contains no
provisions for individual enforcement, Congress must have intended a central-
ized enforcement scheme in order to avoid multiple interpretations of the Act.256
NCLB's lack of individual enforcement mechanisms, however, actually sup-
ports the opposite conclusion. Unlike FERPA, which requires the Secretary of
Education to establish a review board for investigating and adjudicating viola-
tions, NCLB provides absolutely no federal review mechanism or complaint
procedure for an aggrieved individual.257 Where plaintiffs have sought en-
forcement of spending clause legislation via §1983, the Supreme Court has
found it "significant" to a conclusion of enforceability if federal Acts or agen-
cies in charge of administering those Acts do not provide beneficiaries with any
complaint procedures. 8 Although NCLB vests in the Secretary of Education
the power to withhold funds when the Act is violated,259 such "generalized pow-
ers are insufficient to indicate a congressional intention to foreclose §1983
remedies. 26° In a case concerning the enforceability of the Public Housing Act,
the Supreme Court stated that the power to revoke funding is an insufficient
mechanism to "effectively oversee the performance of the some 3,000 local
[public housing authorities] across the country.",261 By comparison, this same
mechanism is exponentially more inadequate to remedy violations of NCLB
school choice provisions because the Secretary of Education is charged with
overseeing approximately 17,000 districts--nearly six times the amount the
Court was concerned about in regards to the Public Housing Act.262 Accord-
ingly, the fact that NCLB contains no provision for individual enforcement
makes the availability of a §1983 cause of action more, rather than less, neces-
sary.
The school choice provisions of NCLB meet all the standards that the
Supreme Court has articulated for establishing a federal right: the provisions are
"directed to the benefit of individual students and parents;" the provisions are
"binding on [the] States;" and the right conferred "is far from 'vague and amor-
phous. 63 Despite any confusion caused by the Supreme Court's reliance on
256 ACORN v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345-46 (S.D.N.Y 2003).
257 The only penalty NCLB provides for violation of the act is the possibility of revocation of
Title I funds. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g).
258 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.
259 "[T]he Secretary may withhold funds for State administration ... until the Secretary deter-
mines that the State has fulfilled those requirements." 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g). NCLB does not
specifically confer authority on the Secretary to remedy district violations-the level of school
administration most likely to require coercion.
260 Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 428 (1987).
261 Id.
262 National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data, http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/ (last
visited Oct. 6, 2005).
263 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 295 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997)).
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implied cause of action cases in Gonzaga, plaintiffs seeking enforcement of
federal statutes under § 1983 need not bear the burden of proving congressional
intent to create individual remedies. 264 Section 1983 itself supplies a general
remedy for vindication of federal rights.265 A narrow reading of Gonzaga risks
undermining congressional intent by rendering §1983 meaningless as an inde-
pendent source of authority. 266 A broad reading, on the other hand, serves the
very purpose of § 1983-"to interpose the federal courts between the States and
the people, as guardians of the people's rights. 267 NCLB promises choice to
students in failing schools. When this promise is abridged, students must not be
left without remedy. NCLB unambiguously confers an individual right to
school choice. Accordingly, courts must not foreclose the availability of § 1983
causes of action to students who have been denied transfers under NCLB.
V. CONCLUSION: PROJECTING THE FUTURE OF NCLB PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE
"And now it's up to you, the local citizens of our great land, the com-
passionate, decent citizens of America, to stand up and demand high standards,
and to demand that no child-not one single child in America-is left be-
hind. ,,268
When discussing or proposing federal education policy it is important to
recognize that overall the federal government's role in public education is com-
paratively small. 269 It is merely a "seven percent investor" in a system in which
states and local communities foot the majority of the bill, and thus have tradi-
tionally exercised largely undisturbed control over the direction and operation of
public schools. 270 Instituting change on a national level is "like trying to lever-
age change in a huge company owned by someone else.",27' Consequently,
264 In a footnote in Gonzaga, the Court concluded that nothing in FERPA's nondisclosure pro-
visions indicated a congressional intent to confer "individual rights on millions of school students
from kindergarten through graduate school without having ever said so explicitly." Id. at 286 n.5.
Citing a "tradition of deference" to state and local school officials, the Court stated that Congress
could not have intended to flout this deference by subjecting school officials to private suits for
money damages. Id. In making this observation, the Court confused its implied right of action
inquiry with its § 1983 inquiry. Unlike implied right of action plaintiffs, § 1983 plaintiffs are not
required to prove congressional intent to provide a private cause of action. Id. at 284.
265 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284. It is only the violation of rights not laws that give rise to a
§1983 action. Id.
266 See Samberg-Champion, supra note 174, at 1882.
267 See CHEMERINKSY, supra note 177, at 470.
268 Remarks on Signing the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in Hamilton, Ohio, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 23, 26 (Jan. 8, 2002).
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while the federal government may certainly be able to prompt reform by requir-
ing strict accountability, any major successes must necessarily rise up from the
local level. Only with the efforts of local educators across America will public
school choice under NCLB become a vehicle for positive change. Resistance to
school choice must not be tolerated by states and local communities.
Admittedly, even assuming the best intentioned implementation of a
public school choice program, physical limitations such as distance and capacity
will prevent the majority of students from transferring to higher performing
schools. "Better" schools are finite and have, despite the suggestion of Depart-
ment of Education regulations,272 finite capacity. But, to those impoverished
and disempowered families whose children have for decades been consigned to
dead end schools, school choice promises a glimmer of hope. While school
choice certainly cannot solve all of this nation's sociological contradictions, it
can save the futures of individual children.
To make good on NCLB's promise to narrow the achievement gap be-
tween advantaged and disadvantaged students, interdistrict transfer options must
be created and parents must be allowed to act as private attorneys general to
enforce the rights of their children to an equal and adequate education.
Decades ago, the defenders of the status quo stood in the
schoolhouse door and said to some, you may not come in.
Now, the defenders of the status quo stand in the schoolhouse
door and say to the grandchildren of many of those same
Americans, you may not come out.
273
If no child is to be left behind, those doors must be thrown open so that all stu-
dents have access to a quality education. The hard-learned lesson of the past is
that money and good intentions alone cannot solve the inequities of America's
public school system. For the good of America's children, NCLB's choice must
be given a chance.
Abigail Aikens*
272 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(d) (2005).
273 147 CONG. REc. H2590 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) (statement of Rep. Pence).
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